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Abstract We present a method to reconstruct networks of socialbots given minimal
input. Then we use Kernel Density Estimates of Botometer scores from 47,000 so-
cial networking accounts to find clusters of automated accounts, discovering over
5,000 socialbots. This statistical and data driven approach allows for inference of
thresholds for socialbot detection, as illustrated in a case study we present from
Guatemala.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze data from the social networking platform Twitter. We use
a statistical approach, with bi-variate Kernel Density Estimates, to detect automated
accounts (socialbots) at scale in a large dataset. We present our BoostNet algorithm,
which allows for the detection of networks of socialbots in microblogs and social
media platforms given a very small number of initial accounts. We illustrate its
performance with empirical data collected from Twitter in relation to current events
in Guatemala.
To begin to describe some of the context of the events that have led to this par-
ticular social media situation, first we point out that the displacement of people due
to armed conflict and corruption is a problem that affects many countries around the
world. This phenomenon has strongly affected the Central American countries of
Honduras and Guatemala. Nevertheless, currently the US enjoys the lowest level of
undocumented immigrants in US in a decade, according to a Pew Research Center
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analysis of government data [7]. The same study indicates that border apprehensions
have declined for Mexicans but risen for other Central Americans.
What are the root causes of migration? Understanding these can better help pre-
vent forced displacement of people and thus also the effects on societies that receive
them. In a previous work we investigated the use of socialbots in Honduras in rela-
tion to protests alleging electoral fraud [5].
Consider the case of Guatemala. The International Commission against Impunity
in Guatemala (CICIG https://www.cicig.org/ [2]) was created in 2006 by the United
Nations and Guatemala. It is an international body whose mission is to investigate
and prosecute serious crime [2].
An independent international body, CICIG investigates illegal security groups
and clandestine security organizations in Guatemala. These are criminal groups
believed to have infiltrated state institutions, fostering impunity and undermining
democratic advances since the end of the armed conflict in the 1990s. The third im-
peachment against President Jimmy Morales for illicit electoral financing during his
electoral campaign in 2015 was requested by the Attorney General and the CICIG.
The mandate of the CICIG was set to end originally on September 3rd, 2019, but
it has been cut abruptly short as Guatemalan President Morales ordered the CICIG
to leave the country on January 7th, 2019 [14].
After we published our work on socialbots in Honduras [5] we were contacted
by a Guatemalan journalist claiming that similar socialbots were acting against the
population there. It was claimed that multiple Twitter accounts were being used
to systematically intimidate and harass members of the CICIG and the media that
covers their activities. In April 2018 we were provided with 19 seed accounts of
potential socialbots that were notorious in this instance for their negative behaviour.
From these 19 accounts we reconstructed a network of over 35,000 accounts,
by collecting their followers and their followees. The rationale is that socialbot ac-
counts are not generally followed by human accounts. Following this premise we
begin with these 19 seed accounts and take two hops out into the follower network
to find potential accounts that are also automated and being used for this purpose.
This method, which we call BoostNet, is explained in Algorithm 1 and the networks
are visualized in figure 1 in terms of reach and spread of the full network, and in fig-
ure 2 in a subset of the most active bot accounts and their retweet relationships. This
strategy led us to discover a socialbot network of over 3000 accounts. To this end
we queried Botometer [11] and performed a statistical analysis of the scores it pro-
vides to find the network of socialbots (explained below, see figure 3). We further
validated our method by using 14 more accounts mentioned in a media interview
about socialbot harassment in Guatemala from November 2018. From these 14 seed
accounts we reconstructed a full network of over 12,000 accounts and found over
2,000 socialbots (see figure 4). There were over 600 socialbots common to both
datasets.
In order to better understand the magnitude of this socialbot network, it is help-
ful to observe that Guatemala has a population of around 17 million people, and
internet users include only 4.5 million [3]. Measurements of social media use in
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Guatemala indicate that 5.24% of internet users are active on Twitter [4]. We can
therefore extrapolate an—admittedly rough—estimate of around 250,000 Twitter
users in Guatemala (2018 figures). In this perspective, socialbot networks of 3,000
and 2,000 accounts can have a considerable impact.
Conclusions: Our work here demonstrates how statistical methods can show the
existence of considerable socialbot network of linked accounts. Given the potential
size of Guatemala’s total Twitter user base, the amount of socialbot accounts could
certainly impede freedom of expression. These findings corroborate the experience
of users (and journalists) who claimed wide-spread abuse of this technology for
nefarious purposes was present in Guatemala.
Moreover, our BoostNet strategy can be employed in other circumstances and
social media platforms, where limited observational data can then lead to a complete
reconstruction of networks of malicious accounts.
2 Data Collection
In this section we describe our strategy to gather a large network of socialbot ac-
counts from a small number of accounts that are reported to be abusing a social me-
dia service. We present an algorithm that can be replicated in other circumstances,
and can be easily implemented to reconstruct a complete network of linked accounts.
2.1 BoostNet: A method to find socialbot networks with minimal
input
The following pseudo-code illustrates our work-flow to construct networks where
the human and socialbot accounts can be analyzed. Our method allows us to find
large networks of socialbots given a small number of starting accounts. We illus-
trate its performance with an empirical case study here, we discovered two sets of
socialbots; one containing over 3,000 socialbot accounts and the second containing
over 2,000 socialbot accounts, starting from only 19 and 14 accounts respectively in
each case that were reportedly harassing journalists and members of the CICIG.
2.2 Comparison with Twitter’s Stream API
One poignant criticism of certain Twitter studies is the reliance on Twitter’s Stream-
ing API for data acquisition. While Twitter’s Streaming API provides free and public
access to a sample of tweets and has promoted research into social networks, there
are certain limitations that its sampling method impose. Here we circumvent these
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Algorithm 1 BoostNet : Bootstrapping Socialbot Network Detection
Require: A collection C of Twitter Accounts
Ensure: Full linked network N(C) of with Socialbot account score
1: Initialize
2: For each account a in C:
3: Collect followers F(C) of the collection C from Twitter’s Rest API
4: Collect those accounts FR(a) who are following a from Twitter’s Rest API
5: Obtain scores of every account in F(C), FR(a) and a from Botometer, to determine if it
is Human or Socialbot
6: Construct a follower-followee network N(C) annotated with Botometer scores
7: return N(C)
8: End
difficulties in finding networks of linked accounts. Connections of followers and
followees were queried from Twitter’s Rest API. In this way we have reconstructed
a full dataset of accounts that are linked in the same connected network.
Certain studies have avoided this sampling bias uncertainty from Twitter’s Stream-
ing API by using the Search API to obtain complete datasets [16]. Another option
seems to be to work directly with Twitter, and some research has been successful at
establishing influence relations using this kind of access [1].
For this work we have reconstructed a full dataset of interest for our research
using the Rest API only.
Fig. 1 Gephi network graph
created using OpenOrd and
Force Atlas 2 force-directed
layout algorithms. The net-
work contains 35,208 nodes,
59,471 edges and 8 distinct
clusters or communities. As
per Twitter’s data policies we
have used the user ID to label
the nodes, and not the account
handle.
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Fig. 2 Gephi network graph
created using OpenOrd and
Force Atlas 2 force-directed
layout algorithms. The com-
plete network (see Fig. 1)
contains 35,208 nodes, 59,471
edges and 8 distinct clusters
or communities, which was
filtered by degree range 50 re-
vealing 14 visible nodes (0.04
%) and 100 visible edges
(0.17 %)of the complete net-
work.
3 Statistical Detection of Socialbot Networks
For a review of Botometer, we recommend [13]. Socialbots have been employed
for political purposes [20]. It has also been observed that this technology is used in
marketing and propaganda [18]. Although research has uncovered other successful
methods of bot detection [8, 12, 9, 10], Botometer provides public API access. The
features it has built in, as well as a review of how it compares to, and surpasses,
other methods can be found in [11, 17].
We have previously used this method for identifying bots in online communities
in Latin America, specifically in Mexico and Honduras [15, 5, 6].
In this work we have concentrated on three of the non-language specific classi-
fiers that Botometer provides. Using the scores from Temporal, Network, and Friend
evaluations that each account in our dataset yields, we aggregate this data and then
find a 2D bimodal behaviour using KDE, as illustrated in figures 3 and 4. A numer-
ical summary of the number of accounts found appears in table 1.
Accounts in Network
Total Bots
April 35208 3009
November 12044 2154
Table 1 Linked accounts in our two datasets, from the full
networks BoostNet reconstructed in April and in Novem-
ber 2018. A comparison between both datasets yields 3688
shared accounts, and at least 646 of them were classified as
socialbots.
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Fig. 3 2D Kernel decomposition estimate for Network-Friend, Network-Temporal, and Temporal-
Friend, pairwise classifiers from Botometer, for the 35,308 Twitter accounts in our 1st dataset,
obtained through our BoostNet method. The regions in the upper right corners correspond to the
over 3,000 socialbot accounts that we discovered. These results were obtained on April 9th-18th
2018.
Fig. 4 2D Kernel decomposition estimate for Network-Friend, Network-Temporal, and Temporal-
Friend, pairwise classifiers from Botometer, for the 12,044 Twitter accounts in our 2nd dataset,
obtained through our BoostNet method. The regions in the upper right corners correspond to the
over 2154 socialbot accounts that we discovered. These results were obtained between November
2018 and January 2019.
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